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Bankruptcy risk is a crucial factor in auditors’ 
decisions whether or not to modify their audit 
opinion based on the going-concern assumption.  
SOX required more extensive audit procedures than 
those required before its passage.  More extensive 
audit procedures should result in more meaningful 
audit reports. This study examines whether the 
auditors’ going-concern opinion provides more 
useful incremental information after SOX than 
before SOX in distinguishing between distressed 
companies that become bankrupt in the next year 
and those that do not.  We find that an audit opinion 
variable adds more useful information to 
bankruptcy prediction models after SOX than 
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before SOX.  Our findings provide evidence that 
financial statement users have derived benefits from 




A sometimes critical and difficult decision faced by 
auditors is whether to modify their audit opinions based on going-
concern assumptions.  Properly assessing bankruptcy risk has been 
a goal of corporate stakeholders for many years.  Auditing 
standards, including Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 
59 (AICPA 1988), contain requirements and guidelines for 
auditors.  SAS No. 59 requires auditors to evaluate the likelihood 
that a company will continue in business for the next year after the 
financial statement date.  Substantial doubt as to a company 
continuing in business requires auditors to include an explanatory 
paragraph after the opinion paragraph that describes the going-
concern problem. Including the explanatory paragraph is 
commonly referred to issuing a modified "going-concern" opinion. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) imposed many new 
requirements on auditing firms including an evaluation of a 
company's internal control over financial reporting.  A motivation 
for SOX was to restore investor confidence in securities and 
publicly available financial information.  Complying with SOX 
required much more extensive audit procedures than were 
previously required.  The extra audit work would presumably 
result in better information provided by auditors. 
When considering a going-concern opinion modification, 
SAS No. 59 suggests conducting analytical procedures (including 
ratio analysis) and reviewing compliance with the terms of loan 
and debt agreements.  Auditors should evaluate the negative trends 
in financial ratios and compliance with loan debt requirements.  
Much previous research has examined what conditions or events 
lead auditors to modify their opinions due to the going-concern 
assumption.  However, we know of no studies that examined 
whether going-concern modifications' usefulness in explaining 
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future bankruptcy significantly improved after SOX compared to 
before SOX -- a potential benefit from SOX requirements.   
This study examines whether auditors' going-concern 
decisions provide more useful incremental information after SOX 
than before SOX in explaining companies’ bankrupt status in the 
next year.  We limited our analyses to information available in 
companies' annual financial reports.  Our sample included 
information from annual financial reports issued for 1997 to 1999 
as our pre-SOX period and for 2002 to 2006 as our post-SOX 
period.   
We find that auditors' going-concern modification 
decisions after SOX added more incremental useful information to 
bankruptcy models than before SOX.  These results provide 
evidence that costly audit procedures required under SOX have 
provided benefits to financial statement users.  The next section 
more fully discusses the motivation for our study and related prior 
research.  Then, we explain our hypothesis and research methods 
and present the results of our analyses.  The final section contains 
our conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
Many market participants view the auditor's report as a 
critical component to warn of impending going-concern problems.  
Many stakeholders tend to view an "audit failure" only as 
situations where clients become bankrupt within the next financial 
reporting period, but auditors failed to issue going-concern 
opinions to them (Blacconiere and DeFond 1997; and Weil 2001).  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) required much more extensive 
audit procedures than were previously required and imposed many 
new requirements on auditing firms.  Many company executives, 
accountants, and others have complained about SOX compliance 
costs (Foster et al. 2007; Akers et al. 2003).  However, extra audit 
work required by SOX could result in the benefit of better 
information provided by auditors. 
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Recent studies including Geiger et al. (2005) and Myers et 
al. (2009) used going-concern modification predictive models to 
test the increase in issuance of those modifications after SOX, 
rather than assessing whether the incremental impact of going-
concern modifications on bankruptcy prediction models changed 
after SOX.  In contrast, Shumway (2001), Beaver et al. (2005), and 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) assessed bankruptcy prediction 
models, but did not consider auditors' going-concern modifications 
in their analyses.  Sun (2007) tested the incremental usefulness of 
going-concern modifications in bankruptcy prediction, but used 
bankruptcy data from 1991 to 2002.  
 
 
Going-concern Modification Literature  
Many prior studies have examined auditors’ going-concern 
modification decisions in different contexts including Carcello et 
al. (1995), Behn et al. (2001), Weber and Willenborg (2003), and 
DeFond et al. (2002).  These studies provided evidence that 
national (Big N) audit firms modified their audit reports due to the 
going-concern assumption more frequently than non-Big N firms.  
In contrast, Geiger and Rama (2006) did not find an auditor size 
affect on going concern opinions in a simple limited to distressed 
companies.  Consequently, we include a control variable for 
auditor size in our bankruptcy prediction models. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) generated research 
in many areas and led to publications in both practitioner and 
academic journals.  Akers et al. (2003) in The CPA Journal 
suggested that publicity of extreme cases such as Enron and 
WorldCom have "spurred new laws and regulations, led to 
increased costs of audit compliance without delivering any 
improvement in the prediction of bankruptcies."  A follow-up 
article (Bellovary et al. 2006) recommended eliminating the going-
concern modification to the audit opinion. 
Academic research has indeed addressed the impact of 
SOX on going-concern modification of auditors' opinions.  Geiger 
et al. (2005) audit opinions for 226 financially stressed firms that 
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entered bankruptcy from January 2000 to October 16, 2001 (the 
date Enron admitted to accounting errors) and from January 2002 
to December 2003.  They also examined bankruptcies from 1991 
and 1992.  Geiger et al.'s (2005) results indicated that auditors 
were more likely to issue going-concern modified opinions to 
subsequently bankrupt companies in the post-December 2001 
period than immediately prior to the Enron scandal and around the 
recessionary period of the early 1990s.  Geiger et al. (2005) did not 
examine going-concern opinions related to companies that did not 
later enter bankruptcy. 
Myers et al. (2009) modified Geiger et al.'s (2005) model 
and also included financially stressed firms that did not become 
bankrupt.  Myers et al. (2009) focused on whether auditors have 
become overly conservative in their issuance of going-concern 
modifications in their audit opinions.  They examined periods 
before and after December 31, 2001 (which proxies for pre- and 
post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act).  Myers et al. (2009, 17) concluded that 
after 2001, non-Big N auditors became significantly more 
conservative in their going-concern modification decisions, while 
going-concern modification decisions of Big N audit firms 
improved for companies that later became bankrupt and those that 
remained nonbankrupt.    
In a recent study, Feldmann and Read (2010) found that the 
proportion of going-concern modifications increased sharply in 
2002–2003 compared to 2000–2001.  However, going-concern 
modifications declined after 2003, eventually to the pre-Enron 
level. However, neither Feldman and Read (2010) nor Myers et al. 
(2009) examined whether the incremental usefulness of the 
auditor's opinion in predicting bankruptcy significantly increased 
or decreased after SOX, which is relevant considering the 
additional cost of SOX compliance. 
 
 
Bankruptcy Prediction Literature  
Many previous bankruptcy prediction studies have used 
logistic regression models (Lau 1987; Chen and Church 1992; 
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Hopwood et al. 1994; Ward and Foster 1996; Mutchler et al. 1997; 
and Foster et al. 1998).  Hopwood et al. (1994) used a sample of 
stressed bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms to develop logistic 
regression models with seven accounting variables.  Distress 
research by Chen and Church (1992) and Mutchler et al. (1997) 
found debt defaults to be positively associated with the probability 
of becoming bankrupt. Consequently, Foster et al. (1998) used 
Hopwood et al.’s (1994) seven accounting variables and loan 
default variables to predict bankruptcy and test the incremental 
value of auditors’ going-concern modifications beyond information 
previously available to the public. 
  Foster et al.’s (1998) results indicated that debt defaults 
significantly explained future bankruptcy.  They also found that 
loan default and covenant violations may moderate the impact of 
going-concern modifications in explaining bankruptcy; going-
concern modifications were not useful beyond the other variables 
included in their model for explaining bankruptcy. Foster et al. 
(1998) concluded that debt defaults were one of the most useful 
indicators of bankruptcy risk. 
 
 
Extensions of Previous Research  
Our study extends previous audit policy research by 
examining whether the incremental usefulness of going-concern 
modifications in explaining bankruptcy has improved due to SOX.  
As control variables, we include the variables used by Foster et al. 
(1998) in our explanatory models.  We also added an audit firm 
variable to control for potential auditor size effects.  Recent 
bankruptcy prediction studies have not included loan default and 
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A main impetus for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was 
financial fraud perpetrated by publicly traded companies and 
associated "audit failures".  (See Akers et al. 2003, for example.)   
In light of increased pressure/expectations on auditors, Geiger et 
al. (2005) and Myers et al. (2009) found that auditors increased the 
issuance of going-concern modifications after SOX.  Thus, based 
on prior research and justifications for passing SOX, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1: Auditors’ going-concern modification decisions 
add more incremental explanatory power to 
bankruptcy models after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
than before the Act. 
 
 
Sample Selection  
Because auditors do not consider issuing going-concern 
opinions unless a firm is under some financial stress, we only 
include stressed firms in our sample.  Even among stressed firms, 
an auditor's going-concern opinion can reduce the surprise effect 
caused by bankruptcy announcements (Chen and Church 1996; and 
Holder-Webb and Wilkins 2000).   We use measures of financial 
stress from previous research (Kida 1980; Mutchler 1985; 
Hopwood et al. 1994; Mutchler et al. 1997; and Foster et al. 1998).  
To be included in our sample, companies must meet one of the 
following criteria:  (1) working capital is negative in the current 
year, (2) a loss from operations in one of the three years prior to 
the event year, (3) negative retained earnings three years before the 
event year, or (4) a bottom line loss in one of the last three years 
before the event year.   
To obtain data from comparable periods of economic 
activity, we include companies that experienced bankruptcy from 
1998 to 2000 (report years 1997 to 1999) in our pre SOX data and 
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companies that experienced bankruptcy from 2003 to 2007 (report 
years 2002 to 2006) in our post SOX data.  Using 2003 
bankruptcies as our earliest post SOX year allows us to use 2002 
financial statement information.  Table 1 summarizes the process 
followed to obtain our sample. 
 
 
Statistical Analyses and Variables  
To statistically test whether audit opinion modifications are 
more significantly associated with bankruptcy after SOX than 
before SOX while controlling for other factors, we generated 
logistic regression models.  Logistic regression has been used 
extensively in research with categorical dependent variables (See 
Foster et al. 1998, for example)   
Our dependent variable was a dichotomous measure 
relating to bankruptcy:   
BANKRUPT =  0 if the stressed company did not 
experience bankruptcy, and 
 1 if the stressed company did 
experience bankruptcy. 
The following independent control variables are based on 
Foster et al. (1998).  The only difference is that we include a 
variable to control for auditor size effects because earlier research 
found that the national audit firms modified their audit reports due 
to the going-concern assumption more than non-national firm 
(Carcello et al.  1995; Behn et al. 2001; Defond et al. 2002; and 
Weber and Willenborg 2003).   
NITA  =  net income/total assets;  
CASALES =  current assets/sales;  
CACL =  current assets/current liabilities;  
CATA  =  current assets/total assets;  
CASHTA  =  cash/total assets;  
LTDTA  =  long-term debt/total assets;  
LSALES  =  log (sales); 
AUDITOR = 1 if auditor was from one of the Big 
N audit firms and 0 otherwise; 
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COVVIO = 0 if firm did not violate a loan 
covenant, 1 if the 10-K or annual 
report the year before the event year 
indicated firm violated terms of 
covenant but did not miss a payment 
or obtain a favorable debt 
accommodation; and 
 LD  = 0 if firm did not loan 
default/accommodate, 1 if the 10-K 
or annual report the year before the 
event year indicated firm missed a 
payment or obtained a favorable debt 
accommodation (missed payments, 
received an extension, favorable debt  
  restructuring, etc.). 
Data needed to construct the auditor variable and 
accounting-based variables were obtained from the COMPUSTAT 
North American Industrial Annual database for the last annual 
financial statements issued prior to bankruptcy.   
The main variable of interest in this study is the interaction 
between audit opinion and pre- or post-SOX.  Thus, the following 
two variables and their interaction were tested: 
OPIN  = 0 if company received an 
auditor’s opinion unmodified 
due to the going-concern 
assumption, and 1 if received an 
opinion modified due to the 
going-concern assumption; and  
SOX_PERIOD = 0 if the data is from the period 
before Sarbanes-Oxley, and 1 if 
the data is after Sarbanes-Oxley. 
The interaction between audit opinion and SOX (OPIN 
*SOX_PERIOD) is the variable of interest in this study.  A 
significant, positive parameter estimate for OPIN *SOX_PERIOD, 
would indicate that auditors’ going-concern modification decisions 
more accurately reflect companies' future bankruptcy status after 
Foster and Ward: Usefulness of Going-Concern Evaluations after SOX 50 




RESULTS FROM ANALYSES 
 
 
Logistic Regression Models 
Table 2 reports results from the logistic regression models 
with interaction terms.  The first model was run on the full data for 
the years identified in Table 1.  Feldmann and Read (2010) found 
that the proportion of going-concern modifications increased 
sharply immediately after SOX, but eventually declined to pre-
SOX levels.  Consequently, we also report results produced by the 
model with the post-SOX observations from 2003 and 2004 
deleted.   
Table 2 shows that the models’ results for the control 
variables are generally consistent with those reported by Foster et 
al. (1998).  Similar to Foster et al., our results suggest that both 
COVVIO and LD are significantly and positively associated with 
bankruptcy; bankrupt firms are more likely to have loan covenant 
violations and/or loan defaults/accommodations than nonbankrupt 
firms one year before the event.  Other significant control variables 
(at p-value < .05) in our bankruptcy model are NITA, CATA, 
LTDTA, LSALES, and SOX_PERIOD.  CATA, LTDTA, and 
LSALES were not significant in the Foster et al. (1998) article, but 
are significant here.  Similar to Geiger and Rama (2006) we did 
not find a national auditor relationship with distress; the 
AUDITOR variable is not significant.  The significant negative 
parameter estimate for SOX_PERIOD indicates that stressed 
companies were less likely to enter bankruptcy after Sarbanes-
Oxley than before.  Based on the sample proportions reported 
earlier, this result is as expected.  
The interaction term OPIN*SOX_PERIOD tests our 
hypothesis that the positive relationship between audit opinion and 
bankruptcy is stronger in the post SOX period.  The parameter 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 




estimates for OPIN*SOX_PERIOD are positive and significant (at 
p-values < .05) as expected in analyses with all observations, and 
the analysis omitting 2003 and 2004 bankruptcies.  The positive 
parameter estimates suggest that auditors are significantly more 
likely to issue going-concern modifications to future stressed 
bankrupt firms after SOX than before SOX; auditors distinguished 
significantly better one year in advance which stressed companies 
would and would not, go bankrupt post-SOX than they did before 
SOX.  Thus, results for the analyses with observations including 
both the pre-SOX and post-SOX period` are consistent with our 
hypothesis; auditors’ going-concern modification decisions added 
significantly more incremental explanatory power to the 
bankruptcy model after SOX than before the Act.  H1 is accepted.   
 
 
Models by Period  
Results for this study did differ somewhat from those 
reported by Foster et al. (1998).  The significant positive sign on 
the parameter estimate for OPIN reported in Table 2 suggests that 
auditors’ going concern opinions were incrementally useful in 
explaining subsequent bankruptcy even after controlling for loan 
defaults/accommodations.  This result is not consistent with Foster 
et al. (1998).  However, Foster et al.'s sample obviously contained 
all pre-SOX observations. 
The significance on OPIN may result from our sample 
containing post SOX data.  Our results for the 
OPIN*SOX_PERIOD interaction suggests that OPIN is more 
strongly associated with bankruptcy after SOX than before SOX.  
The strength of this relationship after SOX may be strong enough 
to render the variable significant even when pre-SOX data is 
included in the sample.  Consequently, we ran separate regression 
analyses on the pre SOX data (from 1998 to 2000, 374 
observations) and the post-SOX data (from 2003 to 2007, 589 
observations).  We also looked at only using data from 2005 to 
2007 for the post SOX model.  Because the results for this model 
Foster and Ward: Usefulness of Going-Concern Evaluations after SOX 52 
were similar to analyses with 2003 to 2007 data, we only report 
results for analyses with the 2003 to 2007 firms. 
 
These models by period results are reported in Table 3.  
Because the models are run within each period, the SOX_PEROD 
variable and related interactions are no longer relevant.  Only the 
LD*OPIN interaction is still relevant. 
Results show that OPIN is very significant after SOX (p-
value < .001), but not significant before SOX (p-value not < .05).  
These analyses reinforce results reported in Table 2.  The 
OPIN*SOX_PERIOD interaction term in Table 2 and the pre-SOX 
period result for OPIN reported in Table 3 are consistent with the 
results of Foster et al. (1998).  Thus, statistical results suggest that 
SOX requirements did lead auditors to issue more useful going 
concern modifications.  Therefore, auditors going-concern 
modifications should help users of financial statements to better 




This study extends prior audit research by testing whether 
the association between going-concern modifications and future 
bankruptcy significantly improved after SOX.  We incorporate 
control variables used in an earlier audit study (Foster et al. 1998) 
and added a control variable for audit firm size.  We used logistic 
regression models to test the relationship between going concern 
modifications and future bankruptcy before and after SOX. 
Our analyses provide evidence that auditors' going-concern 
modification decisions added significantly more incremental useful 
information in explaining future bankruptcy after SOX than before 
SOX.  Thus, our results suggest that the auditors were not 
necessarily just more conservative in their audit opinion 
modifications after SOX, but they better anticipated future 
bankruptcy of stressed companies.  These analyses support the 
contention that costly audit procedures required under SOX have 
provided benefits to financial statement users in the form of more 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 




accurate going-concern modifications.  These benefits should be 
considered in future deliberations of repealing or changing any 
SOX requirements for auditors. 
Unlike some recent bankruptcy prediction studies, (Sun 
2007; Beaver et al. 2005; and Shumway 2001) we included only 
one year lagged data in our models and decided to not employ a 
hazard model with several years of data.   We decided to employ 
more traditional one year lagged logistic regression models for a 
couple of reasons.  First, this study followed the going-
concern/bankruptcy research of Foster et al. (1998).  Thus, the 
same sampling and statistical techniques were used so that any 
differences found in this study could be attributed to the variable of 
interest and not be confounded by differing sampling and statistical 
techniques.  Also, only one lagged year was possible to obtain a 
sample for the post-SOX period.  
Second, loan covenant violation and loan default variables 
were needed because prior research has shown that both are 
significant in explaining future bankruptcy (Chen and Church 
1992; Mutchler et al. 1997; and Foster et al. 1998) and that loan 
defaults may moderate the usefulness of going concern 
modifications in explaining future bankruptcy (Foster et al. 1998).  
However, including loan covenant violation and loan default 
variables physically limits the number of companies that can be 
included in a sample because loan default information must be 
determined by manually examining footnotes to annual financial 
statements.  Addressing the incremental benefit of the going-
concern modification with a larger sample and use of a hazard 
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Bankrupt Post SOX Pre SOX Totals 
    
Identified from bankruptcy.com, Wall Street Journal Index, Lexis-Nexis, or 
Westlaw Business/LIVEDGAR 527 420 
 
Company in inappropriate SIC or not included in COMPUSTAT  (251) (183)  
 276 237  
Insufficient information in COMPUSTAT or were unable to check other 
information in EDGAR (93)  (102) 
 
     Bankrupt Companies with all variables (used in regression models) 183 135 318 
    
Nonbankrupt Post SOX Pre SOX  
    
Initially identified as potential match 643 488  
Insufficient information in COMPUSTAT or were unable to check other 
information in EDGAR (237)  (249) 
 
     Nonbankrupt Companies with all variables (used in regression models) 406 239 645 
    
 Totals of final sample 589 374 963 
Table 2 
Logistic Regression Results 
           Model with 2003 and 
  Model Using Full Data  2004 firms dropped  
 Parameter  Parameter  
 Variables Estimates Wald 
2
 Estimates Wald 
2
 
Intercept -2.97 35.80*** -0.60 1.16 
NITA -0.52 5.40* -0.55 2.75 
CASALES -0.01 1.36 -0.01 1.06 
CACL -0.20 3.47 -0.18 2.28 
CATA 1.10 5.57* 1.42 6.63** 
CASHTA -0.87 1.01 -2.46 4.75* 
LTDTA 1.44 19.72*** 1.27 11.90*** 
LSALES 0.41 7.21** 0.38 4.60* 
AUDITOR 0.18 0.40 0.25 0.54 
COVVIO 1.10 25.72*** 0.42 11.15*** 
LD     0.88 8.76** 0.81 14.35*** 
OPIN 1.76 14.18*** 1.01 21.07*** 
SOX_PERIOD -0.69 9.02** -0.12 0.36 
LD*SOX_PERIOD -0.20 0.3 -0.16 0.66 
LD*OPIN -0.38 1.08 -0.25 1.52 
OPIN*SOX_PERIOD 1.27 4.75* 0.43 4.26* 
LD*OPIN*SOX_PERIOD -0.17 0.15 -0.20 0.21 
     
Model -2Log Likelihood 350.75***  (16df) 237.85*** (16df) 
   
All independent variables and relevant interactions were regressed on a 
dichotomous nonbankrupt versus bankrupt dependent variable (BANKRUPT). 
All of the above variables were defined on pages 7 and 8.   
The Wald 
2
 (1 degree of freedom) tests the significance of each individual 
variable, while the -2Log Likelihood tests the predictive significance of the 
overall model.   
***
Significant at p-value < .001. 
**
Significant at p-value < .01.
 *Significant at p-value < .05. 
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Logistic Regression Results by Period 
 
  Panel B:  Model on Panel B: Model on 
  Data before SOX Period Data after SOX Period 
 Parameter  Parameter  
 Variables Estimates Wald 
2
 Estimates Wald 
2
 
Intercept -0.822 1.58 -4.043 25.86*** 
NITA -1.199 5.18* -0.411 2.69 
CASALES -0.038 0.07 -0.010 1.51 
CACL -0.070 0.25 -0.300 3.36 
CATA 1.106 2.81 0.826 1.49 
CASHTA -1.937 1.76 0.314 0.06 
LTDTA 0.866 3.74* 2.014 17.11*** 
LSALES 0.471 4.73* 0.475 4.32* 
AUDITOR 0.027 0.01 0.175 0.22 
COVVIO 0.347 5.16** 1.487 21.08*** 
LD     0.948 10.39** 2.264 12.27*** 
OPIN 0.549 3.44 3.213 48.02*** 
LD*OPIN 0.328 1.30 -1.711 4.83* 
     
Model -2Log Likelihood 115.659***  (12df) 243.264*** (12df) 
   
***
Significant at p-value < .001. 
**
Significant at p-value < .01.
 *Significant at p-value < .05. 
 
 
 
